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The “Enemization” of Criminal Law? An Inquiry into the 
Sociology of a Legal Doctrine and its Political and Moral 
Underpinnings 
Abstract: The fight against terrorism has undergone major changes over the past thirty 
years. These changes have often been interpreted as a manifestation of “exceptionalism”, a 
trend that should be criticized for undermining the rule of law. We agree with this diagnosis 
but want to take a further step by acknowledging that this critical relationship to the 
developments in counterterrorism is an integral part of the social processes to be studied. 
To this end, our approach places knowledge production at the heart of the scientific study 
of the fight against terrorism. We aim to understand how the so-called enemy criminal law 
– a legal dogmatic undertaking that has been used in various settings to reflect on the issue 
of counterterrorism – has gradually evolved from an objectivist analysis to a critical 
resource, without its axiomatics having fundamentally changed. With the help of what is 
called in France the “sociologie des épreuves”, we show that this transformation has been 
achieved through the confrontation of the doctrine with different sociopolitical contexts. 
We aim to document and help explain this unique trajectory from a sociology of knowledge 
perspective. 
Keywords: terrorism; enemy criminal law; legal doctrine; rule of law; sociology of 
knowledge. 
1. Introduction 
The fight against terrorism has undergone major changes over the past thirty years. In 
this respect, the 9/11 attacks and the ensuing “War on Terror” do not so much constitute a 
break as they reveal and amplify a series of changes that have taken place since the 1990s 
(Bigo, Bonelli, and Deltombe, 2008). At that time, narratives began to emerge on the rise of a 
“new terrorism”, allegedly sustained by fanatical religious motivations, as opposed to an “old 
terrorism”, to which societies and governments were supposedly more or less accustomed and 
which was therefore deemed easier to manage. Regardless of the relevance of this distinction 
(Duyvesteyn, 2004), the rhetoric of a drastic transformation of the terrorist threat has 
contributed to the idea that the means to combat it must be updated (Spencer, 2010): this “new 
terrorism” comes hand in hand with a “new counterterrorism”, based on specific forms of 
expertise as well as distinctive legal instruments and intervention models (Nacos, 2016). This 
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interconnected set of competences, techniques, regulations, and resources has spread widely, 
in particular through intense international cooperation on an issue framed as “global” from the 
outset (Martin, 2007). 
This makes it possible to point out some common features of what can be regarded as a 
general trend. First, to the extent that terrorist organizations take the form of transnational 
networks disregarding – to some degree – national borders, the measures taken against these 
organizations also tend to undermine the division between “internal security” and “external 
security”, blurring the lines between what previously fell within the scope of military action 
and what was within the scope of police action (Deflem, 2010). Second, following a tendency 
observed in other security-related sectors, public action requires more and more anticipation. 
Indeed, reacting to the terrorist threat is no longer sufficient: the threat must be forestalled 
(Aradau and Van Munster, 2007). This imperative explains the extensive use of preemptive 
measures, and the importance given to early detection of “dangerousness” in combatting 
terrorism, both within and outside national territories (Zedner, 2007; Delmas-Marty, 2010; 
Wall, 2016). Third, counterterrorism displays a “punitive drift” (Cochrane and Talbot, 2008). 
By the human rights standards prevailing in liberal states, the guarantees offered to the 
individuals involved in administrative and criminal proceedings related to terrorism are 
decreasing, whereas convictions for terrorist acts are more severe than those for “ordinary” 
criminal acts of equivalent gravity (Alix and Cahn, 2017). In the field of foreign action, this 
drift is most clearly expressed through extralegal kidnapping, rough justice, and targeted 
killing. 
These developments provide the coordinates of an “exceptionalism” that 
counterterrorism is perceived as emblematic of (Neal, 2010): counterterrorism appears to be at 
the forefront of an ongoing shift towards a type of government and social control that 
fundamentally departs from the rule of law and is in direct opposition to its core values 
(Cohen and Atherton, 2008). We acknowledge these analyses and do not dispute their 
conclusions. But we aim to take a further step by introducing an additional element to the 
puzzle, in order to refine the diagnosis of the way in which contemporary societies are 
confronting terrorism. Indeed, while the notion of exception refers to the questionable nature 
of the means deployed in the fight against terrorism, to the extent that they are viewed as 
undermining the very foundations of the liberal-democratic life forms, this concern is clearly 
widespread throughout society and regularly prompts public criticism of the institutions’ 
response to terrorism. The number and intensity of the controversies raised by 
counterterrorism show that, alongside the demand for security, the commitment to civil rights 
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and to human dignity persists. Admittedly, over the last thirty years, the balance has been 
viewed as leaning towards the former. But this has further heightened the tension between 
freedom, justice, and security. Yet the efforts to gain knowledge on terrorism and 
counterterrorism – such as those leading to the conclusion that exceptionalism is increasing –
 are not external to this tension: they are a manifestation of it and must therefore be 
understood as being in keeping with common social attitudes on these issues1. 
This observation calls for an approach that places knowledge production at the heart of 
the scientific study of the fight against terrorism. This analytical shift assumes that the 
reflexivity of the social processes at stake is constitutive of the experience that social actors – 
including those specialized in knowledge production – have of them. Using the technical 
vocabulary developed by pragmatic sociology, we can say that this means considering the 
fight against terrorism as causing “épreuves2”, i.e. situations collectively recognized as 
problematic. Resulting in inquiries and evaluations, such épreuves most often lead to 
disagreements, disputes, and revisions, whose expressions can be analysed (Lemieux, 2011). 
The knowledge effects stemming from these reflexive social processes are due to the efforts 
to restore intelligibility in relation to identified common problems and are mediated by 
specific actors, belonging to identifiable groups, who interpret the concerns and draw 
conclusions from them. But, as regards social knowledge, these expressions of what we will 
call here “épreuves of (counter)terrorism” cannot be reduced to a mere objectification effort. 
They involve what Max Weber calls a “value relation” (Wertbeziehung) (Bruun, 2008). Only 
by taking this aspect into account can we understand how the fight against terrorism leads to 
the above-mentioned frictions between instrumental efficiency and subjective rights. These 
controversies are inherent in the way in which today’s societies are coping with terrorism. 
Consequently, the social sciences’ insights into counterterrorism would remain incomplete if 
they were limited to the expression of a critical point of view. Indeed, such viewpoint does 
                                                 
1 This means continuing and generalizing Luc Boltanski’s repositioning from a “critical sociology” to a 
“sociology of criticism”. Luc Boltanski emphasizes that “scholarly criticism” and “ordinary criticism” should not 
be assimilated to each other; instead, they should be addressed together, without postulating an a priori 
difference in nature (Boltanski, 1990). For a presentation of this approach in the light of ongoing debates in 
international political sociology, see Gadinger 2016. 
2 We keep the French word for this central concept of pragmatic sociology (also called “sociologie des 
épreuves”) (Barthe, de Blic, Heurtin, Lagneau, Lemieux, Linhardt, et al., 2013). To date, no English translation 
adequately reflects all its nuances. Noortje Marres’ (2007) use of the notion of “issue” is similar to the meaning 
that we attribute to the concept of épreuve in this paper. 
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not lie outside the processes under scrutiny: it is an integral part of them and therefore needs 
to be explained3. 
In turn, this orientation requires examining the formation and transformation of thought 
contents in relation to their “value drivenness” (that critical forms of expression remain a key 
indicator of). From this perspective, we have chosen to focus on the development of the so-
called enemy criminal law doctrine. The foundations of this legal dogmatic undertaking have 
been laid in the first half of the 1980s by Günther Jakobs, Professor of Law at the University 
of Bonn, based on an analysis of recent trends in West German criminal law and in relation to 
the counterterrorist instruments developed in the Federal Republic in the 1970s. Relatively 
confidential at first, the doctrine of enemy criminal law met with unexpected success by 
drawing attention, from the 1990s on, in the Spanish-speaking world. Indeed, it aroused 
considerable interest among both academic lawyers and practising officials, who presented it 
as a response to the challenges posed by the fight against rather disparate forms of violence, 
which shared the fact that they were presented as “terrorist” in nature. The doctrine then 
gained renewed significance when the George W. Bush administration launched the “War on 
Terror”. Yet, in the United States, the doctrine of enemy criminal law has had only a minor 
role in the legal analysis of the fight against terrorism and has been completely absent from 
public debate. But this is how, in the mid-2000s, it resurfaced in Europe, where, on the 
contrary, it fuelled the scientific, and increasingly public, discussion on counterterrorism. 
Studying this trajectory of the enemy criminal law doctrine offers a number of 
advantages. First, as we see, this doctrinal undertaking has paralleled the transformations of 
counterterrorism over the past thirty years and has regularly provided a framework for 
reflection on the issues of the fight against terrorism. Second, it has been faced with 
heterogeneous social, political, and legal contexts. From West Germany struggling with small 
revolutionary groups to post-authoritarian Spain battling Basque separatism, from Colombia 
and Mexico facing violent guerrillas and fierce drug cartels to the global situation triggered by 
the attacks that armed organizations carried out in the name of a hawkish image of Islam, it is 
surprising that the doctrine, although supplemented by the épreuves of (counter)terrorism to 
which it has been brought over time, has remained essentially unchanged in its formal 
                                                 
3 It is worth noting that this perspective makes sociological criticism neither illegitimate nor superfluous. 
However, sociological criticism tends to shift according to what, in such an approach, becomes the proper object 
of sociological expertise – namely, the social organization of deliberation forms – and therefore primarily aims 
to uncover the obstacles to the expression and impact of criticism. 
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axiomatics. Except for one aspect – the third reason that makes it worth being examined: in its 
early formulation, the doctrine consisted in merely analysing the transformation of the means 
devoted to the fight against terrorism; during the 1990s, it was, to some extent, about 
justifying these transformations; and, since the early 2000s, its uses have become more and 
more critical, and it is now almost exclusively aimed at denouncing the new faces of 
counterterrorism. 
This last characteristic makes the enemy criminal law doctrine an atypical case. 
Considering the literature on the international circulation of ideas, knowledge, and policies, 
we can see that most empirical examples show that the issues, as well as the groups that 
mobilize, are equivalent from one context to another. Consequently, it is generally assumed 
that ideas, knowledge, and policies spread from one setting to another when they tackle 
similar problems and are passed on by groups with similar interests – even if the 
circumstances are different – sometimes resulting in diverging outcomes (Strang and Meyer, 
1993; Dolowitz and Marsh, 1996). The case of the enemy criminal law doctrine deviates from 
this pattern. Over the last thirty years, counterterrorism policies have undergone largely 
converging developments. However, as one of the most advanced attempts to establish the 
general meaning of this evolution, the enemy criminal law doctrine experienced a radical 
reorientation: it went from an objective use, conceived as a way of validating the “need” for 
the “enemization” – to borrow Cyril Lemieux’s (2016) term – of counterterrorist instruments, 
to a critical discourse on this very evolution, intended to debunk and defeat it. This reversal 
constitutes a puzzle, which we will document and try to explain4. 
To do so, we will follow the trajectory of the doctrine of enemy criminal law: starting 
with its first formalization in the Federal Republic of Germany in the 1980s (2), we will then 
describe how the doctrine was transformed by the épreuves met in Spain, on the one hand, 
and in Latin America (particularly in Colombia), on the other hand (3), in order to understand 
the circumstances of its return in Europe in the 2000s (4). 
                                                 
4 This study is based on an extensive text corpus, which outlines the uses of the notion of enemy criminal 
law and the debates that it has raised. We selected about four hundred texts, from a few pages to several hundred 
pages long. Mainly academic (books and research articles), the corpus also includes texts intended for the 
general public (popular science books, newspaper articles) and for activists (archives, brochures, blogs). The 
corpus can be accessed – and references can be downloaded – here: https://www.zotero.org/groups/163644. 
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2. Germany, 1980s: Where we learn that the rule of law might not be a mere bill of 
rights 
G. Jakobs outlined his thesis on enemy criminal law for the first time in 1985 (Jakobs, 
1985). In short, he suggested that the Federal Republic of Germany’s criminal code and 
criminal procedure code contained certain provisions based on premises so different from the 
rest of criminal law that it would be better to separate them altogether from the latter. His 
distinguishing criterion is the principle of culpability, which, according to him, governs most 
criminal law norms. But a few others depart from this principle: instead of applying to 
criminal acts that have already been committed, these norms apply to criminal acts likely to 
be committed, meaning that the subject’s potential dangerousness has to be anticipated. 
Indeed, for G. Jakobs, these dispositions share a common feature: they no longer serve to 
prosecute material, external, and public wrongdoings, as criminal law theory states. They 
punish behaviours pertaining to what he calls the “inner civil sphere” (interne bürgerliche 
Sphäre), people’s private and intimate lives. These behaviours often merely amount to the 
more or less direct and explicit expression of intentions “normally” beyond the scope of 
public authority’s legitimate intervention. G. Jakobs concludes that, as the state slips into this 
inner sphere, it no longer treats its subjects quite as “citizens” or, as he later says, as “persons” 
(Jakobs, 2006). Instead, it treats them as “enemies” or “unpersons” (Unpersonen), insofar as 
their behaviours supposedly threaten the normative and cognitive validity essential to social 
order. In that case, criminal justice intervention consists of preventive actions, directed at 
subjects suspected of eluding shared social values. 
From this analysis, G. Jakobs concludes that two kinds of criminal law should be 
distinguished, depending on the type of subject being targeted: “citizen criminal law” 
(Bürgerstrafrecht5) and “enemy criminal law” (Feindstrafrecht). In the first case, the subjects 
are identified as members of the legal-political community. As such, they are allowed certain 
procedural guarantees – including, if charged, the right to a fair trial and, if found guilty, the 
fair measure of punishment. By contrast, in the second case, the subjects are considered 
outcasts. If need be, they can be deprived of the rights that they could have enjoyed had they 
remained loyal citizens. In a few words, according to G. Jakobs, citizen criminal law 
corresponds to the humanistic criminal law doctrines. Except that it refers only to citizen 
                                                 
5 Jakobs did not use this notion in 1985. However, as he later explained, it had been logically implied by 
his definition of enemy criminal law from the outset (Jakobs, 2004). 
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rights – not human rights – whereby G. Jakobs inserts a conditional clause in the rule of law: 
the protection of fundamental rights is conditional on the loyal adhesion to political society. 
Enemy criminal law applies whenever this criterion is not met. It involves proactive legal and 
police measures that target hostile intentions. From this perspective, procedural guarantees are 
privileges: they can be granted to a subject but can also be taken away, if necessary. 
Most examples illustrating G. Jakobs’ thesis come from the legal arsenal that the Federal 
Republic has built up since the early 1970s within the frame of the fight against terrorism –
 the kind of terrorism practiced by the so-called urban guerrilla (Stadtguerrilla) groups, 
including the well-known Rote Armee Fraktion. The purpose of these laws was to make it 
possible to incriminate the membership of criminal organizations, the intention, or preparation 
of criminal acts, or even the mere incitement to commit them. G. Jakobs used them precisely 
to shed light on the anticipation logic that, following his diagnosis, was increasingly at work 
in criminal law. Clearly, although somewhat discreet6, his contribution was not only 
theoretical; it also aimed at taking part in the controversies that the fight against terrorism had 
provoked and that still agitated the lawyers’ community in the mid-1980s. 
In order to understand the stance that G. Jakobs intended to take in these controversies, 
we must briefly consider their dynamics over the prior fifteen years. When armed groups 
formed in the immediate aftermath of the “German May” and began to carry out their attacks, 
the German state responded by approving a series of measures to strengthen its capabilities 
against terrorism (Kunath, 2004). Criminal law did not escape this Aufrüstung, and important 
changes were made in that area (Berlit and Dreier, 1984). At that time, the rule of law was a 
sensitive question in the Federal Republic. It was perceived as an essential pillar of the West 
German polity, and any infringement of its principles was met with acrimonious disapproval 
(Schram, 1971). Yet the measures taken against terrorism were quickly seen as breaching the 
legal order and triggered an ongoing criticism. Legal experts, including law scholars, played a 
leading role in these mobilizations. 
But not all law scholars shared this impulse. A characteristic aspect of the formation of 
the postwar German Rechtsstaat must here be considered. This process was at the heart of the 
political construction of the Federal Republic because it reflected the break with the Third 
                                                 
6 Jakobs’ analysis is not only based on the provisions used for the fight against terrorism; it also refers to 
some provisions against organized crime, economic criminality, and sexual crime. Yet what organizes the other 
references around a certain definition of the enemy is doubtlessly the context of terrorism in 1970s and 1980s 
Germany. 
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Reich. However, at the same time, the shortcomings of the Weimar Republic had not been 
forgotten. And criminal law experts commonly attributed these deficiencies to the excessive 
legal formalism of the Weimar Constitution. For this reason, the postwar German criminal 
law community attached particular importance to “material truth” (materielle Wahrheit) 
(Eicker, 2001). Certainly, the two dimensions, the formal and the substantial, were not 
thought of as exclusive to each other: a balance was sought. But the determination of the 
equilibrium was the subject of a heated debate. Those whose positions were perceived as 
overly formalist were held responsible for tying the state down and preventing democracy 
from defending itself (Thiel, 2009). Those who seemed to grant too much importance to the 
material dimension of criminal law were blamed for challenging the absoluteness of 
procedural rights that criminal justice should guarantee. In the latter case, it was easy to point 
out the similarity between this reasoning and that of Nazi legal experts (Müller, 2014). 
This historical background helps understand G. Jakobs’ argumentation. The law scholar 
takes up the anti-formalist stance that has never ceased to be operative in the legal science of 
democratic Germany and, while shifting its terms, pushes for a more “efficient” 
understanding of criminal law and a more “realistic” conception of civil rights. From this 
point of view, it is significant that, long after 1985, when the enemy criminal law doctrine had 
become a matter of scandal, it was often rejected as an expression of the return of the anti-
liberal tradition, the reference to Carl Schmitt being the most common and widespread. 
However, this interpretation fails to clarify G. Jakobs’ exact position. Indeed, while the latter 
bears witness to a form of “conservatism”, it does not imply a break with the ideals 
underlying the formation of the Federal Republic. 
G. Jakobs was much more concerned about what he viewed as the excesses of the 
generation of May 1968 and the devastating effects of its mobilizations (Schmoeckel and 
Mayenburg, 2008). According to him, the events of May 1968 promoted a sort of hysterical 
individualism, unable to understand individual rights other than as abstract attributes of the 
person. G. Jakobs wanted to challenge this view of the individual and contrast it with a 
concrete – in his own words, “sociological” – view of the individual, according to which 
being a member of the legal-political community is considered to be the source of individual 
rights. But this membership must be “effective”: it has to be reflected in conducts conforming 
to the rules that it implies. Individuals can therefore exclude themselves from society by 
behaving in a way that breaks with basic social conventions and commonly expected 
attitudes. For G. Jakobs, such citizens change their status and become “enemies”. As we see, 
this notion is not defined in military or partisan terms; it does not refer to an individual or a 
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group stirring up an armed confrontation for strategic purposes – even if that could be a 
consequence. The enemies are basically portrayed as disloyal citizens who, because of a 
radical ideology or deranged urges, break with their membership of political society in 
thought – if not in deed. 
In the debate between material and procedural justice, the turn of the 1980s clearly 
tipped the balance in favour of the latter. G. Jakobs’ 1985 analysis undermines this liberal 
consensus that had developed in the German criminal justice community, a consensus that, in 
the words of the Minister of Justice himself, consisted in considering procedural rights to be 
the “Magna Carta of the rule of law” (quoted in Vinke and Witt, 1978: 27). However, while 
G. Jakobs opposed this consensus, the situation forced him to do so cautiously and to cultivate 
equivocation. This explains the lukewarm reaction to his 1985 presentation. G. Jakobs’ 
analysis departs from the idea that the enjoyment of rights must be considered unconditional. 
In this respect, it would not have been surprising that the idea of enemy criminal law raised 
strong objections. It did not, though (Gropp, 1985). Overall, his analysis was considered quite 
relevant and legitimate – provided that it be used to criticize the most reprehensible evolution 
of the German state’s protection system. Predominately, the first formulation of the enemy 
criminal law doctrine was thus perceived as being in line with the prevailing doxa. 
The scandal of enemy criminal law did not break in Germany until over a decade later, in 
the late 1990s, when G. Jakobs presented his views again at a major scientific event. On this 
occasion, not only did he reaffirm the existence of enemy criminal law, but he also stressed its 
necessity. Since the number of enemies would increase rather than decrease, he considered 
that “a society aware of the risks cannot simply put this issue aside; nor can it solve this issue 
exclusively with police resources. That is why there is no obvious alternative to enemy 
criminal law”. (Jakobs, 2000: 53) According to most commentators, the German legal 
community’s indignation originated in this shift. G. Jakobs’ idea of enemy criminal law was 
perceived not only as a way of analytically describing (and, implicitly, normatively 
condemning) certain penal norms and practices, but also as a way of advocating their merits 
when ordinary criminal law procedures, which recognize and respect the subjects’ rights, do 
not allow society to defend itself. This stance seemed outrageous to G. Jakobs’ critics. For 
them, indeed, this justification of enemy criminal law would pave the way for the 
implementation of penal policies based on the principles that the doctrine claims to have 
uncovered. 
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3. Spain and Latin America, 1990s: Where we learn that rule of law and state 
sovereignty might challenge each other 
The concern raised by G. Jakobs’ opponents was not unfounded considering the way in 
which the enemy criminal law doctrine had shifted between the mid-1980s and the late 1990s. 
To understand these changes, we have to take into account the épreuves of (counter)terrorism 
to which the doctrine has been subjected when it has been received and discussed in the 
Spanish-speaking world. Since the early 1990s, the law scholar’s work has been published in 
Spanish. G. Jakobs has often been invited to Spain and Latin America, especially to 
Colombia, where he has become a well-known figure in the legal scholars’ community. In this 
new context, the enemy criminal law doctrine has developed aspects which explains both 
G. Jakobs’ hardened stance in the late 1990s and the reactions that it triggered. 
The translation, in the mid-1990s, of the book in which he presented his “theory of 
objective imputation” decisively contributed to making G. Jakobs a reference in criminal law 
science in Spain and in Latin America (Jakobs, 1996). It contains a prologue by Manuel 
Cancio Meliá, a professor at the Autonomous University of Madrid and one of the main actors 
who introduced the enemy criminal law doctrine into the Spanish-speaking world. He 
undertook in-depth research on the subject, leading to the publication, in collaboration with 
G. Jakobs himself, of a work entitled Derecho penal del enemigo (Jakobs and Cancio Meliá, 
2003). M. Cancio Meliá’s featured research topics include terrorism offences. In Spain, this 
criminal field became quite extensive. With the return of democracy, terrorist acts have been 
incorporated into criminal law again (whereas they had been mainly under military 
jurisdiction until then). Since the beginning of the 1980s, the gradual intensification of 
counterterrorist policies, with the fight against ETA as a backdrop, has led to incessant 
changes7. It is the pressing issue of the legal treatment of terrorism, along with the Spanish 
government’s choice of a clandestine means to counter ETA (Guittet, 2008), that led 
                                                 
7 Initially targeting the Franco regime, the action of the Basque organization changed in strategy with the 
abolition of the dictatorship. In 1982, talks took place between ETA and the Spanish central government, leading 
to the renunciation, by parts of ETA, of clandestine violent means of action, but also to a split within ETA, a so-
called military branch wishing to continue the armed struggle for the independence of the Basque Country. This 
split resulted in continuing attacks and assassinations; the murder, by the active members of ETA, of a number 
of former members of the organization who had agreed to benefit from the amnesty; and the creation, in 1983, of 
the Grupos Antiterroristas de Liberación (GAL), a paramilitary organization that carried out targeted strikes 
against ETA members on behalf of the Spanish government. 
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M. Cancio Meliá to look into G. Jakobs’ enemy criminal law doctrine8. But while the former 
considers himself a disciple of the latter, as he embraces the principles of the functionalist 
legal theory, M. Cancio Meliá’s take on the doctrine differs from G. Jakobs’ original intention 
on one crucial aspect. Whereas the German law scholar assumes that a legally codified 
coexistence between enemy criminal law and citizen criminal law is possible, the Spanish 
legal expert considers that enemy criminal law is fundamentally incompatible with the rule of 
law, so that its justification cannot be legal but only political (Jakobs and Cancio Meliá, 2003: 
89 and following). 
This shift greatly influenced the debate triggered by the reception of the enemy criminal 
law doctrine in Spain sparked in universities in the late 1990s and early 2000s. For instance, 
citing this same argument of incompatibility between enemy criminal law and the rule of law, 
Francisco Muñoz Conde (2008), a professor of criminal law at the University of Seville, took 
a public stance against tougher prison sentences. Conversely, other academics found in 
G. Jakobs’ writings the conceptual tools that helped them justify the use of means that are 
considered contrary to the liberal principles of criminal law, but that may well be a “lesser 
evil”, a “sort of ‘law of war’ by which society refuses […] to bear the costs involved by 
freedom of action” (Sanchez, 2001), traditionally guaranteed by criminal law. 
Consequently, the interest in the enemy criminal law doctrine in Spain lies mainly in the 
potential benefit for the political legitimation of counterterrorist measures. As in the Federal 
Republic, it is the question of the limits of the rule of law that has been raised in Spain. But 
the conclusions drawn by Spanish legal experts are different from those of their German 
colleagues who adhere to the enemy criminal law doctrine: for the former, the doctrine 
reflects the politicization of law, which necessarily calls into question the universalistic 
conception of criminal law and the inclusive idea of the rule of law it is based on. As such, the 
doctrine becomes a matter of political analysis rather than of legal science: it expresses the 
mere sovereign claim of the state to protect itself. Here we should remember the important 
differences between terrorism in Germany in the 1970s and 1980s and terrorism in Spain in 
the 1980s and 1990s. Terrorism in the Federal Republic was carried out by a few dozens of 
radical activists, who were aware that it was delusional to try to defeat the State by armed 
                                                 
8 As he puts it, “enemy criminal law’s moment of truth resides in special criminal law and, more precisely, 
terrorist acts” (Cancio Meliá, 2010: 21). 
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force alone and basically intended to confront it by “provoking” it9. In Spain, ETA’s actions 
were incomparably deadlier10: coinciding with a transition from a political regime to another, 
they were meant to unleash an insurrectional situation likely to prompt a separation of the 
Basque Country. We may add that the doctrinal entrepreneurs were not in the same 
ideological configuration in Germany and in Spain. While G. Jakobs responded with his 
doctrine to the “exaggerations” of the rule of law, his Spanish counterparts were faced with a 
situation marked by a dual imperative: consolidating the rule of law after decades of 
dictatorship and ensuring the unity of the Spanish state against violent separatism, including 
through clandestine and illiberal actions. The circulation of the enemy criminal law doctrine 
in Spain expressed this dilemma. 
The introduction of the enemy criminal law doctrine into South America corresponded to 
another sequence of épreuves of (counter)terrorism, during which the doctrine was confronted 
with contexts even more different from the German situation. In this context, the political 
interpretation, as it has emerged in Spain, was even further strengthened, and the enemy 
criminal law doctrine was firmly anchored in a perspective of “state protection”. As in the 
Spanish case, the category of terrorism made it possible to transpose the enemy criminal law 
doctrine from one context to another. G. Jakobs stated this doctrine was indicative of a 
“pacification deficit” (Befriedungsdefizit). If true, the latter was obviously quite limited in the 
case of Germany. This was what the shift to Latin America showed. There, the “terrorists” – 
in G. Jakobs’ terms, the “enemies” – are guerrilla organizations, paramilitary groups, and drug 
cartels. They can hardly be considered as “disloyal citizens” who take advantage of the 
guarantees associated with privacy to carry on hostile intentions. Although they may resort to 
clandestine action strategies, the members of these groups form powerful organizations. They 
often control wide territories and are able to confront the states on equal terms. In these 
contexts, the “pacification deficit” bears no relation to what may be observed in any advanced 
liberal democracy. 
As in Spain, M. Cancio Meliá played an important role in spreading the enemy criminal 
law doctrine in Latin America. Born in Mexico, the scholar published his first articles on the 
theory of objective imputation in Spanish and Latin American journals. His first publication 
                                                 
9 The conflict, over more than twenty years, resulted in a total of 46 casualties, including 16 members of 
the armed groups. 
10 Over a similar period, the number of casualties in Spain was twenty times higher than in Germany, with 
a death toll of 829. 
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on G. Jakobs’ enemy criminal law doctrine dates back to 1996 in Spain and was republished 
in Argentina in 1997. Over the following years, he organized and published the transcripts of 
criminal law conferences with G. Jakobs in Argentina, Peru, and Colombia. At that time, 
work by G. Jakobs had already been published in Colombia. A lecture given by the German 
professor in Colombia was edited by Eduardo Montealegre Lynett, the author of a book in the 
form of a tribute to G. Jakobs (Montealegre Lynett, 2003) and the director of the Centro de 
Investigaciones de Derecho Penal y Filosofía del Derecho (CIDPFD), a main entry point for 
German legal theories in Colombia. In the 1990s and 2000s, G. Jakobs was regularly invited, 
and his writings were often translated and published thanks to the support of the research 
centre. While the enemy criminal law doctrine reached Colombia through the latter, the 
Colombian judicial system soon became interested in it as well, especially through 
E. M. Lynett, who, in addition to be the director of the CIDPFD, was also a magistrate of the 
Constitutional Court of Colombia in the 1990s. 
G. Jakobs’ enemy criminal law doctrine was imported into Colombia during a major 
reorganization of the Colombian judicial system and a profound transformation of legal 
classifications and criminal procedures, with a view to fighting “criminal organizations”, 
whose scale and power bear no relation to Germany’s RAF or Spain’s ETA. From this point 
of view, the doctrine of enemy criminal law was faced with a context whose specificities shift 
its very meaning. As M. Cancio Meliá suggests, the concept of enemy criminal law changes 
radically when applied to a state with a ninety percent criminal impunity rate and whose very 
existence depends on its ability to overcome armed organizations with equivalent or even 
superior resources (quoted by Víquez Azofeifa, 2011: 244). In such case, according to 
Alvarado Reyes (2006), the only realistic alternative to enemy criminal law is not the full 
realization of the rule of law; it is the withdrawal, perhaps even the disappearance, of the state 
itself. 
To deal with this dramatic situation, a series of measures were taken during the 1990s, 
including the “Statute for the Defence of Justice” (Estatuto para la Defensa de la Justicia), 
also known as “Faceless Justice” (Nagle, 2000). These measures explicitly aimed to align the 
judicial and police system with the military goals of the fight against groups for whom the 
state was merely a faction in an armed conflict. As Farid Samir Benavides (2015) points out, 
these measures bear the mark of the enemy’s criminal law doctrine. Its influence on the legal 
transformations was so strong that some Colombian lawyers have been using the phrase 
“constitutional law of the enemy” (Abad, 1999: 136 and following). Thus, the idea of enemy 
criminal law became a legitimation resource for political and administrative actors eager to 
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justify actions whose compliance with the principles of the rule of law mattered less than their 
efficiency at winning a war. 
Alejandro Aponte (2004; 2006) offers a sharp analysis of the uses of the enemy criminal 
law in Colombia11. According to him, there are fundamental differences between what 
happens in Western countries and in Colombia. Western countries are not in a state of war. 
On the other hand, the state of war is sufficiently consistent in Colombia to describe the latter 
as a country where war and peace have been coexisting for over fifty years. As such, the 
Colombian case can be viewed as symptomatic of the overall reception of the enemy criminal 
law doctrine in Latin America. In short, because Latin America societies in the 1990s are 
characterized by high inequality and authoritarianism, they experience such a low degree of 
integration and high level of violence, compared to European societies, that the disloyal 
citizen figure suggested by G. Jakobs is only marginally relevant there. Thus, the idea of the 
enemy criminal law doctrine comes to be based on a distinct enemy figure, somewhere 
between the subversive activist and the seditious criminal. This figure outlines a very different 
continuum, which no longer goes from revolutionary militants to white collar offenders and 
sexual predators, but from guerrilleros to militiamen and from paramilitary forces to drug 
traffickers. 
4. Europe, 2000s: Where we learn that the rule of law might not depart from human 
rights 
The circulation of the enemy criminal law doctrine in Latin America has no doubt 
influenced G. Jakobs’ later conception of it. The enemy figure he had in mind in 1999, when 
he spoke again in front of his German colleagues, was no longer the one that had informed his 
initial analysis. At that time, the enemy criminal law doctrine had clearly become relevant 
wherever armed groups called for state interventions in which the legal system served security 
and military objectives. 
But another aspect must be brought in. His 1999 talk took place at a time when the 
perception of terrorism was undergoing important changes in Western societies. We do not 
know for sure whether G. Jakobs had considered the growing threat of violent Islamism when 
                                                 
11 A. Aponte’s work has decisively contributed to the diffusion of G. Jakobs’ enemy criminal law doctrine 
in Latin America, although A. Aponte claims that he stayed clear of – and even in part objected to – G. Jakobs’ 
stance. 
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he spoke before the Berlin-Brandenburg Academy of Science12. However, it is undeniable 
that, by the time the September 11 attacks happened, the measures taken by the United States 
and, under its leadership, by other countries had become an object of great interest and 
reflection for the doctrine’s users (Jakobs, 2006; Polaino-Orts, 2009). They were quick to 
stress how relevant the doctrine was to the analysis of the counterterrorist strategies in the 
“War on Terror” context. The development of the enemy criminal law doctrine in relation 
with this new épreuve of (counter)terrorism rests on analogical reasoning, based on the 
thought – hereafter formulated by Carlos Gómez-Jara Díez (2008: 531) – that “the situation in 
Guantánamo and the enemy combatants’ debate does present similar issues to the ones raised 
by enemy criminal law”. 
This parallel is enough to lead to a new shift in the doctrine. The nature of the change 
becomes apparent if we consider the fact that, at least in the beginning of the “War on 
Terror”, the provisions adopted by the US on the treatment of “unlawful enemy combatants” 
may potentially have been applied to anyone, with the notable exception of US citizens, who 
had to be subjected to procedures in compliance with the rules of the US criminal law system, 
regardless of the charges brought against them13. Thus, assuming that the counterterrorist 
instruments implemented by the United States actually operate on principles similar to those 
revealed by the enemy criminal law doctrine, the concerned subjects – the “enemies” – are 
still formally exterior to the US political society (Cole, 2003). In this case, the doctrine 
outlines a criminal law oriented towards the outside of the US political society, towards 
citizens of other states, against whom the American state resorts to means that it would not 
use against its own. Moreover, this criminal law is not supported by police and judicial 
                                                 
12 Although it is unlikely that he did not do so in view of a series of events that he could hardly have 
ignored. For example, consider the Algerian situation and its repercussions in France, or the attacks on the 
Khobar towers in Saudi Arabia, on the American embassies in Nairobi and Dar-es-Salam, and then on the 
USS Cole in Aden, which already testified to the rise of Al-Qaeda – not to mention the Taliban’s takeover in 
Kabul and the widespread idea, since the late 1990s, that Afghanistan had become the new “sanctuary for 
terrorism”. 
13 We can mention the case of John Phillip Walker Lindh, the “American Taliban”. He was captured 
in 2001 in Afghanistan and detained at Qala-i-Jangi fortress, where he took part in uprisings that claimed the life 
of a CIA officer, among others. Later, he was repatriated. But he was not taken to Guantánamo. He was brought 
to trial before a federal grand jury. He pleaded guilty and was sentenced to twenty years in prison (Fischer and 
McDonald, 2005: 636-37). 
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institutions; it is supported by the classical instruments of external intervention, like the army 
and the secret services. 
This reasoning leads to the idea that the enemy criminal law doctrine can also apply to 
foreign activities, carried out by armed forces and oriented towards enemy aliens. However, 
such activities are traditionally referred to as war. And, as such, they are supposed to obey 
certain rules, in particular regarding targets as well as legal and illegal means. Yet these 
operations demonstratively do not follow them (Engeland, 2011). From this perspective, the 
enemy criminal law doctrine no longer concerns what would otherwise be a sort of 
complement to domestic criminal law. It tends to turn enemy criminal law into an alternative 
to the law of war, capable of giving legal meaning to certain forms of armed intervention at 
international level, opening up an unprecedented political and legal space, where the 
guarantees offered by both liberal criminal law and international humanitarian law are 
simultaneously suspended. 
The enemy criminal law doctrine has never received significant attention in the United 
States. But, as its supporters claimed that it was able to shed light on the new counterterrorism 
arsenal, it came back to Europe with the public controversies triggered by extraordinary 
rendition and Guantánamo, by the Patriot Act and waterboarding, by PRISM and targeted 
killings. But from then on, the enemy criminal law doctrine has predominantly been picked up 
from a critical standpoint. With this move, its diffusion has attained an unprecedented scale. It 
has reached its greatest extent in Germany, where hundreds of contributions can be found on a 
wide variety of media, both academic and for the general public – with the proximity between 
advocacy organizations, professional legal groups, and law scholars being at its highest, 
echoing the situation at the turn of the 1980s. Due to the early reception, quite a similar 
diagnosis can be made about Spain since the beginning of the 2000s, when the enemy 
criminal law doctrine was no longer considered in relation to Basque terrorism, but in relation 
to the evolution on the “War on Terror” front. In France, Italy, or Belgium, the critical 
reception of the enemy criminal law doctrine began later and has remained more limited, 
rarely reaching the mainstream public space. But the confluence of academics, legal 
professionals, and activists, clearly visible in Germany and Spain, can also be found. 
There are two main trends in this critical momentum. The first one tackles the enemy 
criminal law doctrine itself, pointing out its underlying ideological inspiration. These 
contributions stress the idea that G. Jakobs and his followers rekindle the specifically German 
anti-liberal legal tradition, embodied by Carl Schmitt (Stübinger, 2015). This conceptual 
genealogy comes with a search for historical legal forms foreshadowing the kinds of measures 
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and instruments that the enemy criminal law doctrine thinks out. The most obvious historical 
reference is the Third Reich. But other, more or less unexpected, precedents are mentioned, 
ranging from the repression of witchcraft in early modernity (Jerouschek, 2007) to the GDR’s 
criminal justice system (Vormbaum, 2018). This critical approach to the enemy criminal law 
doctrine holds that the doctrine, which relates both to the most dubious aberrations of legal 
thought and to the darkest times of Western history, must be viewed as erroneous from the 
standpoint of legal science, as it violates the letter and the spirit of modern criminal law 
institutions and the prevailing legal culture. Accordingly, it can neither really be 
conceptualized nor, as such, be practiced (Crespo, 2006). 
The second trend of this critical momentum is different. While it fears the legitimation 
effects of the enemy criminal law doctrine, it does not so much level its criticism at the 
doctrine as at the measures and instruments that it addresses, which can be criticized precisely 
because they show enemy criminal law “at work”. These criticisms are jointly formulated by 
scholars, law practitioners, and human rights activists (Uwer, 2006; Sullivan and Hayes, 
2010), who examine the issues of counterterrorism in Europe as well as the recommendations 
made by European institutions (for instance, Gössner, 2009).They scrutinize a series of 
provisions – suspension of terrorist groups’ assets, extension of prerogatives of the judges in 
charge of counterterrorism, security detention, new surveillance practices, de-radicalization 
and “punitivity” – to shed light on the general logic behind them, a logic that the enemy 
criminal law doctrine enables them to name. 
These two trends form the two sides of the same critical enterprise. This is only possible 
on one condition: a limit, initially set by G. Jakobs, who has always refused – first by 
dodging, then blatantly – to overstep it, had to be lifted. As we have said, G. Jakobs wanted 
the enemy criminal law doctrine to be strictly descriptive: any other consideration, in 
particular any kind of evaluation, was considered both outside the realm of science and 
outside the realm of law. However, this attitude has encountered a lot of incomprehension: to 
confine oneself to providing objectivity to the law when the law is enemy criminal law 
supposes that one refrains from establishing that this law does not fit with the ideals of justice; 
even worse, to say that indeed it is law amounts to validate and legitimate the possible 
injustice resulting from it being, precisely, the law – as opposed to it being an infringement of 
the law, which would be possible to say if we were to adopt a normative concept of law. As 
Tatjana Hörnle (Hörnle, 2006) has shown, the explanation of the normative dimension of the 
enemy criminal law doctrine has been the prerequisite for the critical taking over of its 
concepts. Only then has it become possible to identify and study legal realities that are both 
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consistent with the principles of enemy criminal law, which the doctrine of the same name has 
uncovered, and at variance with the ideals of justice to which these legal realities should 
conform in order to be consistent with the historically acquired conception of the rule of law. 
The way in which the enemy criminal law doctrine became a subject of debate in the 
French context is enlightening. The first mentions of the doctrine appeared shortly after the 
adoption of the security detention law in 2008, which authorizes the continued detention of 
persons convicted of murder, rape, or torture who have already spent at least fifteen years in 
prison, if they are likely to present “a particular dangerousness characterized by a high 
probability of recidivism”. In that respect, enemy criminal law has been considered to be a 
sign of – and a vehicle for – a broader transformation of the modern penal rationality, from an 
offence-centred model towards a perpetrator-centred one. Geneviève Giudicelli-Delage 
emphasizes that the German counterterrorist legislation, one of the areas of criminal law 
G. Jakobs claims to have studied, is nothing more than a case – surely paradigmatic, but still – 
documenting the broader change every law scholar, as a jurist, has to fear and oppose 
(Giudicelli-Delage, 2010). In the same vein, the issue of the Revue de science criminelle et de 
droit comparé dedicated to enemy criminal law described G. Jakobs’ doctrine as a relativist 
theoretical attempt to oppose the expansion of international criminal law. Indeed, according to 
Mireille Delmas-Marty, it can be understood as a response to (terrorist, but also non-terrorist) 
massacres, which tends to justify the use of violence against the perpetrators, in contrast to 
what she calls a “criminal law of inhumanity” (Delmas-Marty, 2009), which would be the 
legal path to pursue these perpetrators. The junction between these importations of enemy 
criminal law relies on what both G. Giudicelli-Delage and M. Delmas-Marty consider to be 
the deep antagonism between the doctrine and the humanist principles underlying modern 
penal rationality. Indeed, in order to elaborate the central argument of the enemy criminal law 
doctrine, G. Jakobs needs to rule out the notion of humanity of persons to the benefit of the 
concept of “juridical person” (Alix, Jacquelin, Manacorda, and Parizot, 2016). 
At this intersection where academia and social movements meet, it is clear that the 
normative – that is, necessarily critical – conception of the enemy criminal law doctrine has 
prevailed not only in France but in all European countries, including Germany, where 
G. Jakobs has been marginalized. It is perhaps more interesting to observe that, at least once, 
this issue was also decided in court, so that G. Jakobs’ position was in some way not only 
scientifically and morally, but also legally invalidated. This invalidation resulted from a 
decision of the highest Spanish Court. In a judgement that overturned a conviction for 
terrorism, the magistrates based their decision on the fact that the information leading to the 
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conviction of the accused had been obtained while he was detained in Guantánamo by 
Spanish police officers, who had not clearly notified him of their professional status. In a 
lengthy justification for the decision, the court pointed out that confirmation of the conviction 
would be tantamount to legalizing the use of methods contradicting the principles of criminal 
law. But the magistrates explicitly added that this would mean recognizing the legal validity 
of the enemy criminal law doctrine. Yet the judges asserted, this was legally impossible 
because 
“the State cannot defend the values of freedom, coexistence, plurality, and human 
rights through initiatives characterized by the violation of the values it claims to 
defend. […] For this reason, enemy criminal law would, more precisely, mean 
denying criminal law, insofar as it seeks to deprive its potential recipients of 
something specific and non-derogable: their status as citizens of the ‘polis’.” 
(Tribunal Supremo, 2006) 
The decision of the Spanish Supreme Court can be understood as the obstacle that the 
enemy criminal law doctrine comes up against when pressed. Considering the whole 
movement, the socio-historical trajectory of the enemy criminal law doctrine could be 
summarized as follows: forged by a positivist study of West German criminal law, the 
doctrine strives to take into account legal reality only, although, through contact with various 
épreuves of counter(terrorism), it has become a normative doctrine that, in the name of law, 
legitimizes legal provisions widely criticized from the point of view of the defence of legal 
humanism. But the Spanish decision shows that this interpretation is not quite accurate. 
G. Jakobs repeats it over and over again: he has been, and still is, a law scientist, and nothing 
in his analysis deviates from the analysis of the facts. Simply, by analysing the facts in a 
strictly positivist manner, G. Jakobs is obliged, by the very nature of his scientific approach, 
to offer the legislators justified reasons to produce the law that they produce. The positive 
presentation of the legal provisions constituting the corpus of enemy criminal law does 
therefore not imply that they fulfil its normative foundations; it merely implies that we 
consider that, once law is produced, it is indeed law. This is what the Spanish decision is most 
strongly opposed to. It is a strong reminder for G. Jakobs that there is no such thing as a 
strictly positivist version of the law if, by this, we mean a purely formalist conception of the 
law; on the contrary, it states loud and clear that the law is intrinsically normatively oriented 
by ideals, and that it is illusory to think that a law scholar can analyse law texts by ignoring 
this fact. In democratic societies, to be law, law must be in accordance with a set of shared 
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principles. As the law of these societies cannot be a law that validates any dissociation in the 
treatment of the citizens whose relations it governs, consequently, enemy criminal law cannot 
be law. In a way, the Spanish Supreme Court explains to G. Jakobs what his profession is all 
about: if he wants to produce a positivist analysis of the law, he must embrace its normative 
foundations. This is what the return of the doctrine in Europe – that is, a return as a critical 
means – teaches: the trajectory of enemy criminal law is not that of a doctrine that is positivist 
first and that later on becomes normative; rather, it is that of a doctrine whose normative 
content is expressed differently, as it has been confronted with various épreuves of 
(counter)terrorism, to reach a point where its normativity appears to contradict the normative 
foundations that makes the law the law. 
5. Conclusion 
This study sought to solve a puzzle: how can a doctrine, whose wording barely changes, 
change so much? How is it possible that, in 1985, the doctrine of enemy criminal law 
expressed a cooled-down, objectivist experience of West German counterterrorism norms, 
while it expresses now, some thirty years later, a highly critical experience of the legal 
developments in a context of concern about contemporary counterterrorism? Following the 
example of Gilles Deleuze, when he reworked the notion of “jurisprudence” (Deleuze, 1995), 
we wanted to examine this strange phenomenon: not much change (in the doctrine), and yet 
everything changed (in what it expresses). The key to solving this enigma lies in the type of 
understanding of the circulation of the enemy criminal law doctrine that we defend in this 
article. We argue that it is necessary to move away from the opposition between two 
approaches conceived as mutually exclusive: one that considers the content of a given thought 
undertaking to be irreducible to its sole contextual uses; and the other that, on the contrary, 
only takes into account the historical and social contexts that alone would give meaning to 
this thought undertaking, but thus leads to neglecting its content (Shapin, 1992). The 
sociology of épreuves approach never strives to dissociate the content from the context, 
considering that the two are reproducing themselves through reflexive processes “in the 
making” (Latour, 2005). 
In this sense, from a sociological standpoint, the value of the enemy criminal law 
doctrine is that it reveals a highly controversial orientation in the perception and treatment of 
certain acts of violence, which terrorism has come to epitomize since the first decade of the 
twenty-first century. This is why we have sought to shed light on the relevance that certain 
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actors have, over time, granted to the enemy criminal law doctrine. We have followed the 
successive changes in the relation to this doctrine since the mid-1980s, through different 
épreuves of counter(terrorism), in which the problem of terrorism was embodied in specific 
contexts guiding the way in which certain groups – not equivalent from one context to 
another – reoriented it. At the beginning, in 1980s Germany, the enemy criminal law doctrine 
was supported by a small group around G. Jakobs. They defended a heterodox and provoking 
stance in a debate focusing on the legal means of the fight against a specific type of 
revolutionary terrorism. In the following decade, the enemy criminal law doctrine has been 
taken up in several Hispanic countries. This resulted in numerous translations, studies, and 
publications. At that time, the situations that the doctrine was faced with in these new 
environments were incomparable with the original context. The doctrine thus incorporated 
aspects that had been until then beyond its scope and became a tool for thinking about near-
war situations. At the same time, the doctrine moved away from the sole academic sphere, 
being promoted as government knowledge by persons and groups acting as intermediaries 
between the scientific world and public institutions. Finally, in the 2000s, a new context 
emerged as the world was faced with the threat of Islamist terrorism. States resorted to 
unprecedented counterterrorism techniques, which seem to precisely conform to the enemy 
criminal law doctrine. While G. Jakobs and some of his South American colleagues were 
quick to point out the relevance of the doctrine in order to shed light on the rationale behind 
these techniques, others saw it as a way of expressing what they considered the debatable 
nature of these developments in counterterrorism. This critical stance has become dominant in 
Europe, to the extent that, in some cases, the enemy criminal law doctrine as such has become 
an explicit focal point of the public debate sparked by the fight against terrorism. As shown, 
this axiological reversal nevertheless took place at a cost: as the critics turned the enemy 
criminal law doctrine around, they also gave it a new lease of life. To denounce the legal 
provisions that the enemy criminal law doctrine recognized and, furthermore, supported, the 
critics paradoxically conceded the existence and relevance of the doctrine. This new life of the 
doctrine led the integration of the critical version of enemy criminal law has been integrated 
into the legal field itself, as the 2006 Spanish court decision showed. In some way, we have 
come full circle: in 1985, G. Jakobs wanted the enemy criminal law doctrine to remain 
exclusively in the legal domain; in 2006, the Spanish court argued that enemy criminal law 
could simply not claim to belong to the legal system of democracies. 
Nothing changed in the doctrine; yet, it changed entirely, with an important clarification 
of what kinds of internal links connect the legal form of the law to its normative content. In a 
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sense, one could say that things could not be different: despite G. Jakobs desperate 
disclaimers, the first formalization of the enemy criminal law doctrine was immediately 
perceived as a critical point of view, precisely because of these inevitable internal links 
between the legal form and the normative content of the law. This aspect became increasingly 
obvious, to such an extent that the enemy criminal law doctrine forced a normative choice: 
one had to be “pro” – as was mainly the case in Latin America – or “con” – the latter option 
having become predominant in Europe since the early 2000s. It is therefore not surprising that 
whenever the doctrine-inspired legislative measures seem to triumph, not only are these legal 
provisions criticized in the name of the diagnosis produced by the doctrine, but they are also 
criticized as being non-legal in the light of the normative principles of the law in democratic 
societies. 
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